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Abstract
This article is part of a series written for people responsible for making decisions about health policies and
programmes and for those who support these decision makers.
In this article, we address the issue of decision making in situations in which there is insufficient
evidence at hand. Policymakers often have insufficient evidence to know with certainty what the
impacts of a health policy or programme option will be, but they must still make decisions. We
suggest four questions that can be considered when there may be insufficient evidence to be
confident about the impacts of implementing an option. These are: 1. Is there a systematic review
of the impacts of the option? 2. Has inconclusive evidence been misinterpreted as evidence of no
effect? 3. Is it possible to be confident about a decision despite a lack of evidence? 4. Is the option
potentially harmful, ineffective or not worth the cost?
About STP
This article is part of a series written for people responsible for
making decisions about health policies and programmes and for
those who support these decision makers. The series is intended
to help such people ensure that their decisions are well informed
by the best available research evidence. The SUPPORT tools
and the ways in which they can be used are described in more
detail in the Introduction to this series [1]. A glossary for the
entire series is attached to each article (see Additional File 1).
Links to Spanish, Portuguese, French and Chinese translations
of this series can be found on the SUPPORT website http://
www.support-collaboration.org. Feedback about how to
improve the tools in this series is welcome and should be sent to:
STP@nokc.no.
Scenario
The Ministry of Health is considering strategies to recruit and
retain health professionals in underserved rural areas. You have
been asked to advise the Minister of Health about these strate-
gies. You have found many articles describing strategies that
have been used in other settings, but no reliable evaluations of
the impacts of such strategies [2].
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In this article, we present five questions that policymakers
and those who support them can ask when considering
scenarios in which there may be insufficient evidence to
inform judgements about the impacts of policy and pro-
gramme options.
It is unrealistic to assume that one can predict the impacts
of a health policy or programme with certainty. Many gov-
ernance, financial and delivery arrangements have not
been rigorously evaluated. Neither have many of the pro-
grammes, services and drugs that these arrangements sup-
port. But policymakers must still make decisions
regardless of the availability (or paucity) of evidence to
inform such decisions.
In this article, we focus on decision making undertaken in
instances in which there is insufficient evidence available
to be able to know whether an option will have the
impacts intended, or whether it may have unintended
(and undesirable) impacts. Common mistakes made
when there is insufficient evidence at hand include mak-
ing assumptions about the evidence without a systematic
review, confusing a lack of evidence with evidence of no
effect, assuming that insufficient evidence necessarily
implies uncertainty about a decision, and the assumption
that it is politically expedient to feign certainty. We
present four questions in this article that can help to avoid
these.
Questions to consider
If there is insufficient evidence at hand to allow one to be
confident about the impacts of implementing a policy or
programme option, the following questions can be con-
sidered:
1. Is there a systematic review of the impacts of the
option?
2. Has inconclusive evidence been misinterpreted as evi-
dence of no effect?
3. Is it possible to be confident about a decision despite a
lack of evidence?
4. Is the option potentially harmful, ineffective or not
worth the cost?
1. Is there a systematic review of the impacts of the option?
The first step in addressing a perceived lack of evidence is
to find out what evidence is available. It is risky to make
assumptions about the availability of evidence without
referring to systematic reviews. Considerations related to
finding and critically appraising systematic reviews are
addressed in Articles 5 and 6 in this series [3,4].
For many questions related to health systems it is not pos-
sible to find relevant and up-to-date systematic reviews.
There is widespread recognition, for example, that health
workers are critical to achieving the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) and other health goals. Yet despite
this, an overview of systematic reviews of options to
address human resources for health found only a small
amount of high-quality, synthesised research evidence
regarding the effects of a few options for the improvement
of human resources for health [5]. Other overviews of
reviews have found similar gaps [e.g. [6]]. A lack of sys-
tematic reviews may not necessarily reflect a lack of evi-
dence. But under such circumstances it is difficult for
policymakers to know what evidence is available (see
Table 1, for example).
Rapid assessments may need to be undertaken when time
or resources are limited. These assessments should be
transparent about the methods used, as well as any impor-
tant methodological limitations or related uncertainties.
They should also address the need for, and urgency of,
undertaking a full systematic review at a later date [7].
Consideration should also be given to commissioning a
new review whenever a relevant, up-to-date review of
good quality is unavailable. Appropriate processes should
be used, including setting priorities for systematic reviews
[8]. Building and strengthening international collabora-
tions, such as the Cochrane Collaboration http://
www.cochrane.org, can help to avoid unnecessary dupli-
cations of effort involved in producing systematic reviews
and help to ensure that up-to-date reviews are more read-
ily available.
2. Has inconclusive evidence been misinterpreted as 
evidence of no effect?
Another common mistake made in instances when evi-
dence is inconclusive is the confusion of a lack of evidence
of an effect with 'evidence of no effect' [9]. It is wrong to
claim that inconclusive evidence shows that a policy or
programme has had 'no effect'. 'Statistical significance'
should not be confused with importance.
When results are not 'statistically significant' it cannot be
assumed that there was no impact. Typically a cut-off of
5% is used to indicate statistical significance. This means
that the results are considered to be 'statistically non-sig-
nificant' if the analysis shows that differences as large as
(or larger than) the observed difference would be expected
to occur by chance more than one out of twenty times (p
≥0.05). There are, however, two problems with this
assumption. Firstly, the cut-off point of 5% is arbitrary.
Secondly, 'statistically non-significant' results (often mis-
labelled as 'negative'), might or might not be inconclu-
sive. Table 2 contains a further discussion of this pointPage 2 of 7
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cally non-significant' or 'negative' can be misleading.
Trends that are 'positive' (i.e. in favour of an option) but
'statistically non-significant' are often described as 'prom-
ising' and this can also be misleading. 'Negative' trends of
the same magnitude, in contrast, are not typically
described as 'warning signs'.
Policymakers should be aware that researchers commonly
make these mistakes. To avoid being misled, they should
be watchful for misinterpretations of statistical signifi-
cance.
3. Is it possible to be confident about a decision despite a 
lack of evidence?
Some policymakers may agree with Charlie Brown, who
claimed: "I am always certain if it is a matter of opinion"
But most would agree that high-quality evidence provides
a better basis for being confident about decisions. Never-
theless, there may be good reasons for being confident
about a decision even when there is a lack of evidence.
There is very low-quality evidence, for example, that giv-
ing aspirin to children with influenza or chicken pox may
cause Reye's syndrome (a rare but deadly condition) [10].
Despite the limitations of this evidence, the US Surgeon
General and others have confidently advised against the
use of aspirin in these circumstances. This is because of
the availability of paracetamol (acetaminophen) as an
equally effective and inexpensive alternative which allows
children not to be put at risk, even if there is uncertainty
about the actual level of the risk itself. Conversely, it may
be reasonable to be confident that policies or programmes
with high costs and potentially serious adverse effects
should not be rolled out without a rigorous impact evalu-
ation.
4. Is the option potentially harmful, ineffective or not 
worth the cost?
"Professional good intentions and plausible theories are insuffi-
cient for selecting policies and practices for protecting, promot-
ing and restoring health. Humility and uncertainty are
preconditions for unbiased assessments of the effects of the pre-
scriptions and proscriptions of policy makers and practitioners
for other people. We will serve the public more responsibly and
ethically when research designed to reduce the likelihood that
Table 1: An independent inquiry into inequalities in health - an example of the need for up-to-date systematic reviews to know what 
evidence there is
In 1997, the incoming British Labour government was keen to reduce inequalities in health. To do this, it set about obtaining advice from the public 
health community about how to reduce inequalities, but clear limits were set about what advice it would find acceptable. The government wanted 
the advice quickly but stipulated that the advice had to be backed by evidence, in keeping with the government's expressed desire that public policy 
should be based on evidence [31]. The public health and other communities responded enthusiastically. A considerable amount of material was 
produced by, and for, the inquiry and many recommendations were made [32].
Subsequent reviews of the recommendations, however, found little evidence for the likely or actual effectiveness of many of the recommendations 
[32]. There was also a striking lack of adequate searches for relevant evidence or attempts to avoid bias in the way information was identified, 
appraised, and used.
This is not to suggest that governments cannot develop or implement policies that lack the support of unequivocal evidence. A lack of evidence 
does make it difficult, however, for them to decide on priorities. The readiness of researchers to recommend policies while knowing little about the 
likely effectiveness makes this more difficult still.
The task of this particular inquiry in the United Kingdom would have been easier if up-to-date systematic reviews had been available. Further, a 
system to ensure that the inquiry's recommendations would be reviewed regularly as new information and evidence emerged from updated 
systematic reviews, would have helped to ensure that adjustments in policies could have been made. This could also have helped to avoid similar 
future difficulties when similar inquiries were undertaken or similar policies considered in other jurisdictions. International networks such as The 
Cochrane Collaboration http://www.cochrane.org (which focuses on healthcare) and the Campbell Collaboration 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org (which focuses on education, crime and justice, and social welfare) have structures for preparing and keeping 
systematic reviews up-to-date, and these can facilitate the more effective use of evidence.
The investment of public resources in primary research has been substantial and remains so. But the returns remain far less than might otherwise 
have been expected, and the results scattered rather than synthesised. People faced with tasks and timescales similar to those of the British inquiry 
would be assisted greatly if up-to-date systematic reviews were more readily available. In terms of developing health policies and programmes, 
there are no unequivocal answers to the question "What works?" A systematic review is the best starting point for finding out what is known.
Table 2: 'Statistical non-significance'
Figure 1 illustrates two problems that arise when results are classified as 'statistically non-significant' or 'negative':
1. The classification is based on an arbitrary cut-off. The results of Study 1, for example, are marginally different from the results of Study 2. But by 
using the conventional cut-off of P < 0.05, the results of Study 1 are ranked as 'statistically significant' and the results of Study 2 as 'statistically non-
significant'.
2. 'Statistically non-significant' results may or may not be inconclusive. If the short green vertical line in the figure below indicates the smallest effect 
considered important, the results for Study 3 would be conclusive, since an important impact is highly unlikely. The results for Study 4 would be 
categorised as 'inconclusive' since it is not unlikely that there would be an important impact (the 95% confidence interval crosses the threshold for 
what is considered to be an important effect). Both results, however, might be regarded as 'statistically non-significant' or 'negative'.Page 3 of 7
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expected element of professional and policy making practice,
not an optional add-on." (Iain Chalmers, Editor, the James
Lind Library, presentation at the Norwegian Directorate
for Health and Social Welfare, 1 September 2003. For a
more detailed discussion of these comments see Reference
[11])
It is risky not to acknowledge uncertainty for the sake of
political expediency. As we noted in Article 1 in this series
[12], acknowledging that there is imperfect information
to inform policies can reduce political risk because it
allows policymakers to set in motion ways to alter course
if policies do not work as expected.
As the quote above suggests, good intentions and plausi-
ble theories are insufficient when selecting policies and
practices. This is true for health systems as well as clinical
interventions. Examples of clinical interventions found to
be relatively ineffective or harmful after initially being
believed to be beneficial and widely used, include:
• High instead of low osmolar rehydration solutions for
children with diarrhoea [13]
• Diazepam or phenytoin instead of magnesium sulphate
for women with eclampsia [14,15]
• Six or more antenatal care visits instead of four [16]
• Corticosteroids for patients with severe head trauma
[17]
• Albumin instead of salt water for resuscitation in criti-
cally ill patients [18]
• Hormone replacement therapy to reduce the risk of cor-
onary heart disease and stroke in women [19]
• Electronic mosquito repellents for preventing mosquito
bites and malaria infection [20]
All the above interventions were based on underlying the-
ories, indirect evidence, surrogate outcomes, and observa-
tional studies: randomised trials subsequently disproved
all the underlying assumptions. This supports the asser-
tion (quoted above) that by making rigorous evaluations
an expectation rather than an option for informing deci-
sions about the provision of clinical interventions, the
public can be more responsibly and ethically served.
These same concerns apply to health systems and public
health interventions. Examples of health systems and
public health interventions that have been widely used
and advocated, but which may be ineffective and do more
harm than good, include the following:
• Educational and community interventions to reduce the
risk of teenage pregnancy [21]
• Directly observed therapy for tuberculosis [22]
• User fees for essential medicines [23]
• For-profit instead of not-for-profit private hospitals [24]
• Reducing maldistribution by requiring doctors to spend
a minimum number of years in an underserved area
before allowing them to specialise [2]
• Some forms of results-based financing or pay-for-per-
formance [25]
• Contracting with the private sector to provide health
services [26]
Two problems with classifying results as 'statistically non-sig-nificant' or 'negat ve'Figure 1
Two problems with classifying results as 'statistically 
non-significant' or 'negative'. The blue dots in the Figure 
above indicate the estimated effect for each study and the 
horizontal lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals. A 95% 
confidence interval means that we can be 95% confident that 
the true size of the effect is between the lower and upper 
confidence limit (the two ends of the horizontal lines). Con-
versely, there is a 5% chance that the true effect is outside 
this range.
:[QRRQO`
?`aPeó
?`aPeô
?`aPeõ
?`aPeö
\)ò$òöû
\)ò$ò÷ó
\)ò$úò
\)ò$ôò
@T^Q_T[XPR[^
cTM`U_O[Z_UPQ^QP`[NQ
MZUY\[^`MZ`QRRQO`
:[QRRQO`
2Mb[a^_`TQ_`M`a_]a[
[^O[Y\M^U_[Z
2Mb[a^_`TQ\[XUOe
[^\^[S^MYYQ
2Mb[a^_`TQ_`M`a_]a[
[^O[Y\M^U_[Z
2Mb[a^_`TQ\[XUOe
[^\^[S^MYYQPage 4 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7(Suppl 1):S17 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/S1/S17Substantial caution is required before investing scarce
resources in policies or programme options requiring
large investments that cannot be recouped [27]. If there is
important uncertainty about the impacts of such options,
a rigorous evaluation (such as a pilot study, for example),
can prevent the potential for resource wastage. And while
such undertakings may appear to present unnecessary
delays, Julio Frenk, the former Minister of Health from
Mexico, has noted: "Both politically, in terms of being
accountable to those who fund the system, and also ethi-
cally, in terms of making sure that you make the best use
possible of available resources, evaluation is absolutely
critical" [28]. Decisions both in support of an option and
those against, may be equally likely to have undesirable
consequences if there is insufficient evidence (see Table 3
for an example and further explanation). Informing poli-
cymaking by testing a proposed option within a well-
designed impact evaluation offers a better approach.
When judgements about the effects of options are based
on theories, surrogate outcomes, limited observational
studies, inadequate impact evaluations, anecdotal experi-
ence or analogies, policymakers should be cautious about
implementing them (see example in Table 4) [29].
And even if there is little uncertainty about the benefits of
an option, there may still be important uncertainty about
other potentially important consequences, including
unintended effects (harms) and costs (see example in
Table 5). Policies or programmes with compelling ration-
ales can, in fact, cause harm.
For an option that is promising, but for which there is
insufficient evidence to be confident about whether it is
potentially harmful, ineffective, or not worth the cost,
consideration should be given to requiring a well-
designed impact evaluation. This can be undertaken either
prior to rolling out the policy or programme, or integrated
as part of the rollout. We address further considerations
regarding monitoring and evaluation in Article 15 of this
series [29].
Table 4: An example of a potentially ineffective or harmful intervention that has been widely promoted based on insufficient evidence
Effective drugs for tuberculosis have been available since the 1940s. Despite this, two million people continue to die from the disease each year, 
mostly in low-income countries. People with tuberculosis require treatment that lasts between six to eight months. Many find it difficult to 
complete their course of treatment and this serves as a major constraint to eradicating the disease. Poor adherence to treatment can lead to 
prolonged infectiousness, drug resistance, relapses, or even death. Incomplete treatment thus poses a serious risk both to the individual and to 
communities as a whole.
Directly observed therapy (DOT) seeks to improve the adherence of people to tuberculosis treatment by using health workers, family members, or 
community members to directly observe patients taking their anti-tuberculosis drugs. DOT is potentially advantageous because adherence may 
improve when people are closely monitored and there is a social process involving peer pressure. Potential disadvantages include the fact that this 
treatment moves away from adherence models of communication, with their emphasis on cooperation between patient and provider, back to a 
traditional medical approach where the patient is a passive recipient of advice and treatment. Also, resource implications for such a policy are 
substantial, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where the case load may be high. DOT may also make adherence worse if it is rigidly 
applied in an authoritarian setting, or where people are expected to travel considerable distances to have their treatment supervised.
The World Health Organization (WHO) and others have actively promoted DOT since the 1980s, generally as part of a comprehensive 
tuberculosis management programme known as DOTS (directly observed therapy, short course), a five-element strategy for the control of 
tuberculosis. Although the strategy as a whole appears sound, there is substantial uncertainty about DOT as a key element of DOTS. When DOTS 
was originally launched, the evidence for the effectiveness of DOT came entirely from observational studies and no randomised impact evaluations 
of DOT had been undertaken. Subsequently, 11 randomised trials have compared DOT with self-administration and found that DOT did not 
improve adherence, despite the substantial resources required and its other disadvantages [22].
Table 3: The consequences of saying "no" or "yes" instead of "only in the context of an evaluation"
All countries face resource constraints. For this reason, in the United Kingdom for example, the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) officially recognises the principle of recommending that when important uncertainties exist about an intervention's effects, such 
interventions should only be used in the context of research [27]. Sixteen (approximately 4%) of NICE's technology appraisal recommendations 
published between 1999 and early 2007 advised the use of a technology only in the context of research. The consequences of getting decisions 
wrong by either saying "no" or "yes" to a technology without doing so, are summarised below (see Reference [27] for further details).
The consequence of saying "no" instead of "only in research"
• Patients are denied access to promising and potentially effective technologies
• There are delays in building the evidence base in key areas, with a resulting negative overall impact on health outcomes
The consequences of saying "yes" instead of "only in research"
• Access to unproven and potentially harmful or ineffective interventions is promoted
• Any ongoing or future research in the field is severely hindered. Important questions on effectiveness and cost-effectiveness may never be 
answered
• Limited resources are wasted
• Having to reverse a "yes" decision in the light of any future evidence compromises credibility and is difficult to implementPage 5 of 7
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Most health policies and programmes are complex and
they are likely to have multiple effects. Some evidence will
almost always be available based on experience with sim-
ilar policies or programmes in other settings. However, as
addressed in Articles 8 and 9 in this series, it is important
for policymakers to consider how much confidence to
place in such evidence and to assess the applicability of
the findings to their own setting [4,30]. Typically, there
will be uncertainty about the impacts of policies and pro-
grammes on important outcomes. When there is impor-
tant uncertainty, common mistakes such as those
described in this article should be avoided.
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